We consider an economy where risk neutral banks provide intermediation services and risk neutral producers demand credit to finance their working capital needs. Our model blends costly state verification with imperfect enforcement power. We show that a weak legal system combined with high information verification costs leads to large, first-order effects of volatility on production, employment and welfare. A calibration illustrates that a one percent increase in the coefficient of variation of productivity shocks would reduce welfare by more than one percent. We suggest that legal and information problems explains why volatility has profound effects on emerging market economies.
Introduction
Following the Tequila period, its after-effects in Latin America and more recent events in South East Asia, the effect of volatility on emerging market economies has become an important topic of research (see Sachs et. al (1995) , Edwards and Vegh (1997) , and Agenor and Aizenman (1998) ). In many of these papers, the domestic financial intermediation process is advanced as one of the most important transmission mechanisms for volatility effects. At the same time there has been continued interest in issues related to imperfect information and rationing in credit markets (see the seminal article by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) , the review by Jaffee and Stiglitz (1990) and the many references therein). The themes in this literature include imperfect information and imperfect legal enforcement powers and (hence) high lending spreads and/or credit rationing.
What appears to be lacking in the literature is a model which combines elements of the microeconomic models of credit markets which gives rise to costly financial intermediation combined with the effects of volatility on production in an economy where credit is an input. To some extent, Edwards and Vegh (1997) is the closest model to attempt to close this circle and these authors generate interesting results regarding the effects of external shocks on economic performance. However, in their model financial intermediation is costly because of an exogenously imposed non-remunerated reserve requirement on banks rather than any more fundamental problem in the credit market and, although shocks are analyzed, the model does not incorporate uncertainty explicitly. We feel that to capture the effects of volatility on macroeconomic performance, uncertainty should be modeled directly and we prefer to model banking costs as the result of information and enforcement imperfections.
To motivate our theoretical analysis to follow we first present some statistical information regarding Argentina. Argentina is a country which suffered more than most from the fall-out of the Mexican devaluation at the end of 1994 and the increase in perceived risk as international investors considered that -3 -the current economic program, often referred to as the Convertibility Plan, was at risk. As illustrated in Figure 1 , this economic program had resulted in strong GDP growth since its implementation in 1991 and a strong growth in credit to the non-financial private sector. However, in 1995 the nominal credit to the non-financial private sector fell by 3.4% (from the IV quarter of 1994 to the II quarter of 1995, when the level of credit was at a minimum). Over the same year, nominal GDP fell by some 4.3% (IIIQ 1995 over IIIQ 1994 and unemployment rose from 12.2% in November 1994 to a peak of 18.4% in May 1995. The fall in GDP and the rise in unemployment was largely attributed to the credit-crunch in the economy following the increase in perceived volatility.
------------------Insert Figure 1 ---------------------
A more detailed analysis of the credit market reveals a number of further interesting features.
Argentina provides an example of a country with high average lending spreads but also a very high dispersion of interest rates. Table A gives statistics on average lending rates plus the standard deviation of rates charged across banks in the financial system broken down by different types of credit and Figure 2 illustrates the distributions of these interest rates across banks in the financial system for different loan categories for 1995-6.
------------------Insert Table A ---------------------Four points are worth noting with respect to these statistics. First, lending interest rates remain high (the average lending rate in the system in 1996 was about 18%) especially bearing in mind that inflation in Argentina was of the order of 1% for the same year. Second, average rates vary depending on the type of credit with very high rates found for overdraft facilities and personal credits which have no guarantees and significantly lower rates found for mortgages, other collateralized loans and also for lending on bills discounted -largely for firms' working capital needs. Third, the figure illustrates that the dispersion of interest rates across banks remains very high. Fourth, the standard deviation depends very much on the type of loan with typically low standard deviations found for those loans with guarantees (mortgages and other secured credits) and for loans to companies for working capital (discounted bills) and high standard deviations for non-secured loans such as overdraft facilities and personal credit.
At first sight, these stylized facts do not accord with the simplest theoretical models of credit rationing. Indeed, the traditional quantity credit-rationing story implies that observed interest rates might be lower than expected and that, given banks' incapacity to discriminate, the dispersion of observed rates might also be low. Naturally, such highly stylized models are designed to convey the strong message that information asymmetries may result in market imperfections and do not, by design, attempt to reflect the complexities of actual financial contracting within a varied market-place.
In this paper we present a model which we believe is sufficiently rich to explain many of these stylized facts. The model also retains the central message of simple credit rationing stories in that there may still be a backward bending supply curve for credit. The added richness stems from assuming that individuals are subject to an uncertain 'productivity shock', that repayment is an active decision of the debtor who may chose to default depending on potential legal penalties and that there is imperfect information in that it is costly for banks to verify customer income in default states. Each of these items (uncertainty, legal penalties and the state verification cost) could potentially vary across individuals and hence may explain the tremendous cross-sectional variation in the data.
Our model is not only capable of explaining this cross-sectional variation of interest rates but also has strong implications for the combined effect of volatility and imperfect information on the supply of credit and (hence) on employment and output. In particular, we suggest that the effect of an increase in volatility may be multiplied by the presence of imperfect information causing much more significant drops in employment and output than might otherwise be expected. We show that a weaker legal system and more costly verification of information increases the welfare cost of volatility. The combination of these factors implies that volatility induces large, first order welfare and employment costs in countries characterized by costly intermediation. Our calibration illustrates that the semi elasticity of welfare with respect to productivity shocks' coefficient of variation is below -1 for reasonable parameter values (i.e., a one percent increase in the coefficient of variation of productivity shocks would reduce welfare by more than one percent).
We suggest that the interaction of increased uncertainty, poor legal enforcement capabilities and imperfect information may then account for the severity of the effect of volatility on emerging market -5 -economies including Argentina. Moreover, our model predicts an increase in both average interest rates and in the dispersion of lending interest rates would follow a rise in uncertainty and as we have seen in the analysis above, both phenomena occurred in Argentina in 1995.
Our approach is then a blend of the state verification approach (due to Townsend (1979) ) and the 'willingness to pay' models often associated with sovereign lending (Eaton, Gersowitz and Stiglitz (1986) provides an early review). The idea is that banks have poor information with respect to client incomes (the return on projects undertaken by borrowers) and that borrowers decide whether to repay or not depending on the benefit of so doing and the penalties associated with default. Imperfect information is captured in the assumption that in default states, banks must pay a verification cost to capture at least a part of the borrower's income. However, banks do have some idea of the verification costs which may vary across clients and here we have in mind in particular the quality of the information on bank customers (balance sheets, income projections etc.). We also investigate the case where banks cannot discriminate between clients at all and calculate the welfare consequences of the situation where banks must offer homogenous loan contracts. Volatility is captured by the uncertainty associated with the return on customers' projects and for combinations of high uncertainty and high costs for state verification, interest rates may be very high or indeed credit may not be offered at all. We also consider the use of collateral in the loan contract.
Collateral turns out to be an important feature which can serve to both reduce the lending interest and increase the supply of credit. Furthermore, we find that collateral reduces the dispersion of interest rates as found in accord with the empirical evidence cited above.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic model and section 3 describes a set of simulation results. Section 4 considers the case of endogenous output and employment and considers the consequences of increased volatility on economic performance. The results of the paper suggests certain policy conclusions which are discussed in section 5 and section 6 concludes.
The model
We consider an economy where risk neutral banks provide intermediation services. Agents demand credit to finance their working capital. Producers who lack access to the equity market rely on bank credit -6 -to finance the cost of variable inputs, due to be paid prior to production. Our model blends the costly state verification approach [Townsend (1979) ] and the limited enforceability of contacts [used frequently in the external debt literature, as in Bulow and Rogoff (1989) ]. The project's future productivity is random. The realized productivity shock is revealed to banks, only at a cost. Producer's default on the bank's loan implies that the creditor would 'seize' any collateral set as part of the loan contract, plus a fraction κ of the project's value. Seizing involves two types of costs. First, verifying the net worth of the project is costly;
second, enforcing repayment may require costly intervention of the legal system.
We assume a large number of domestic producers using an identical production function, subject to an i.i.d. productivity shock. The future output of agent i is given by
where M denotes the variable input [raw material, labor, etc.] , and ε i is the realized idiosyncratic productivity shock. The contractual interest rate on the working capital of agent i, committing a collateral
, . We assume that producers must finance the variable input costs prior to the sale of output, and 
We denote by ε i * the highest productivity shock leading to default --
If default never occurs, ε i * is set at the lower end of the support ( ε i * = −Ε). In case of default, the bank's net revenue is the producer's repayment minus the state verification and contract enforcement cost,
The cost C is a lump sum, paid by banks to identify the productivity shock ε i , and to enforce the proper payment. The analysis is more involved if some costs are paid after obtaining the information about ε i . In these circumstances, banks will refrain from forcing debt repayment when the realized productivity is below an "enforcement threshold." For simplicity of exposition we refrain from modeling this possibility.
We assume that banks have access to elastic supply of funds, at a real cost of r 0 . 2 Banks are risk neutral and competitive. Each is serving a large enough pool of borrowers so as to diversify away the bank's exposure to the idiosyncratic risk, ε i . The contractual interest rate is determined by the expected breakeven condition:
where f ( ) ε is the density function. For future reference, it is useful to rewrite this condition as ( )
1 1 1
Substituting (3) into (5'), we obtain that the interest rate spread is determined by
The contractual interest rate is determined by a "mark up" rule, exceeding the bank's cost of funds by the sum of two terms. The first term is the expected revenue lost due to partial default in bad states of nature. The second term measures the expected state verification and contract enforcement costs. Note that a higher collateral increases the costs of default, reducing thereby the frequency of defaults [as seen from the drop of ε i * , see (3)]. Consequently, higher collateral reduces the financial spread.
We ignore also all other real costs associated with financial intermediation. Adding these consideration would not modify the key insight of our analysis.
2
This credit may be supplied by foreign banks, as was modeled in a different context by Agenor and Aizenman (1998) . The assumption that the supply of funds is elastic rules out the possibility of credit rationing due to supply shortage, a possibility modeled by Williamson (1986) .
The producer's expected net income equals
Applying (5), we can simplify (7) to
The optimal employment of the variable input is found by maximizing (8).
If shocks follow a uniform distribution, − ≤ ≤ Ε Ε ε , the spread (6) is characterized by a quadratic
is the probability of default. The second term of (6') is illustrative of how producers pay for the information asymmetry through the banks' mark-up rule given our assumption of a competitive banking sector. Combining equations (3), (6') and (8) one can infer that, for an internal solution where credit is supplied and where the probability of default is positive, the contractual interest rate
where the signs of partial effects are above the corresponding variables.
To gain further insight, we review in the next section the case where shocks follow a uniform distribution, and supply of an individual producer is inelastic. Specifically, suppose that the project's i
3
To infer the relevant signs we solve explicitly ε i * using (3), and substitute it in (6'). 
Financial spreads, volatility and heterogeneity
We proceed with a review of several simulations of the case where shocks follow a uniform distribution. All the results inferred can be verified analytically [see the appendix for an overview of the derivation].
The volatility of the productivity shock plays a key role in determining financial spreads. This can be seen in Figure 3 -I which plots the equilibrium interest rates as a function of the standard deviation of the distribution for the case of two producers whose cost of state verification differ (C = 0.1 and C = 0.08). 5
We assume first the absence of a collateral (L = 0). Curve LL corresponds to a lower cost of state verification, and HH to a higher cost. In general, the interest rate/volatility curve is backward bending, and a given volatility may be associated with 2 interest rates. This follows from the presence of a trade off between the interest rate and the frequency of full repayment. 6 Note that the efficient point is associated with the lower interest rate, as more frequent default is associated with a lower expected surplus [see (8)].
Henceforth we will assume that competitive banks choose the efficient point, and we will ignore the backward bending portion of the curves.
Note that even if the potential supply is inelastic, volatility will induce welfare costs. First, as (8) reveals, more frequent partial defaults lead to welfare loss due to more costly financial intermediation [note that the expected cost of financial intermediation is C times the probability of default]. Second, as we will show shortly, volatility will terminate some projects that are viable in its absence, leading to large welfare losses.
5
It can be shown that the standard deviation of the uniform distribution is E 3 0 58 ≅ . .
6
A higher interest rate would increase the probability of default, implying that the net effect of a higher interest rate on the expected repayment is determined by elasticity considerations.
Volatility has a profound effect on the interest rate. As Figure 3 -I reveals, this effect is more profound for agents whose state verification cost is higher [see Appendixes A and B for further analytical discussion]. In fact, for large enough volatility, projects characterized by relatively large state verification costs will not be financed. 7 Our example focuses on the uniform distribution, yet its message is general.
This follows from the expected brake-even condition determining the interest rate, (5). It can be rewritten
where 
The properties of the min ( ) ;
function imply that the repayment is concave with respect to the realized productivity. Consequently, higher volatility will reduce the expected repayment, reducing the RHS of (5"). This would induce banks to charge a higher interest rate, to offset the drop in expected repayment. Note that the higher interest rate would also increase the probability of default, reducing thereby the net expected repayment by the increase in the expected outlay on monitoring costs,
Hence, the ultimate increase in interest rate must be high enough to compensate for both the drop in expected repayment and for the increase in expected monitoring costs. Consequently, we expect that higher monitoring costs would magnify the needed increase in interest rate. Depending on the values of the various parameters, a significant enough volatility may imply that financing the project is 7 These considerations also imply that the simulations reported in Figure 3 are sensitive to the choice of parameters. This follows from the observation that the range where the supply of credit is upwards sloping depends on all the parameters of the model. This sensitivity is due to the inherent non-linearity of the supply of credit. As Appendix B illustrates, the qualitative results of our analysis are applicable to all distributions.
too risky, as would be the case if the bank's expected income would be negative at all interest rates. See
Appendix B for a formal derivation of these results for a general distribution.
The consequences of submitting a collateral are summarized in Figure 3 -II, which corresponds to the case where C = 0.1, and the collateral levels are either 0 or 0.02. The infusion of collateral shifts the schedule HH rightwards and upwards, to H'H'. The shift is non uniform --it is more profound for higher volatility and for higher interest rates. Hence, collateral infusion alleviates the financing constraint, and reduces the interest rate for a given volatility. the absence of collateral. Hence, we should expect a lower dispersion of financial spreads in collateralized loans, and this difference is more profound in countries characterized by higher volatility. 8
4.
Volatility and the output response
In the previous section we assumed an exogenously given level of inputs used in the production process. In this section we review the implications of a volatile productivity, allowing for an endogenous adjustment of inputs. Specifically, we would identify the adjustment of the demand of inputs to the volatility of shocks, and the resultant change in the expected final output level. Recall that the expected profits are
Applying (6') we infer that in the range of partial default
Let us denote by Ε * the volatility threshold leading to default (i.e., Φ i = 0 for E = Ε * , and Φ i > 0 for E > Ε * . This would be the case if in the worst realization of productivity shock (ε = −Ε * ), the penalty associated with partial default would equal the input cost (inclusive of the financing cost), For example, if E = 0 2 . , projects characterized by relatively high state verification costs would not be financed in the absence of collateral [hence, if L = 0, the gap between the spreads corresponding to C = 0.1 and 0.08 is infinite], whereas the gap between the corresponding financial spreads will be about 6% with L = 0.02. For further analysis on the importance of internal financing in mitigating the adverse effects of costly monitoring see Bernanke and Gertler (1989) . 
In the absence of collateral, the volatility default threshold depends positively on creditors' power within the legal system (as measured by κ, the fraction of the project's value that can be seized by creditors), and negatively on the importance of working capital [as is depicted by the share of the variable input β]. The volatility threshold increases for collateralized loans by the [collateral/output subject to confiscation] ratio.
For Ε Ε > * , the producer would compare the expected profits in two possible regimes. In the first, the producer would find occasional partial defaults optimal. In these circumstances, the optimal employment of the variable input is found by maximizing (11), where the default probability is given by (12). In the second regime, the producer would prefer to scale down the use of input M i to a level low enough to ensure that no default will take place in the worst state. The corresponding demand for We may refer to curve AB as the region of a quasi "voluntary" credit squeeze, where producers reduce employment as a mechanism to prevent costly default.
Comparing points A and B reveals that increasing volatility from zero to Ε = 0 13
. reduces the producer's expected surplus by about 16%, and reduces employment of the variable input by about a 1/3. At a certain stage [point B], the benefits of default outweigh the costs of state verification, inducing a default. The default option mitigates the costs of volatility, as it shifts the burden of servicing the marginal debt to relatively good states of nature. This implies that further increase in volatility would reduce M's employment along BD at a lower rate than along AB. for the difference is that higher volatility has two conflicting effects. First, more frequent defaults increase the cost of employing the variable input, reducing employment. Second, the higher volatility raises the
------------------Insert Figure 4 ---------------------

10
The only difference between the two figures is due to a change in the variable input share (β is 0.7 and 0.5 in figures 4 and 5, respectively).
-15 -expected marginal product of M, as the marginal product is convex with respect to employment. 11 When the variable input share is smaller, the second effect is more profound, as the convexity of the marginal product is larger. For a small enough share, the second effect dominates, as is the case in Figure 5 . Note that independently from the direction of the adjustment of employment, higher volatility reduces welfare in both cases. In interpreting these results, one should keep in mind that they deal with the atomistic agent, for the case where the relative price of M is given. Inferring the aggregate employment and the aggregate supply implications of this adjustment requires extending endogen zing the relative price of M, a task that is left for future research.
The above simulations illustrate that the costs of volatility depend crucially on the interaction between several factors --the costs of financial intermediation, creditors' power within the legal system, and the share of variable inputs. Weaker legal system (implying a small κ), a more costly verification of information and legal enforcement (large C), and a large share of the variable input (large β) increase the welfare cost of volatility. The combination of the three would imply that volatility may induce large, first order welfare and employment costs, as is illustrated in Figure 4 . We turn now to a more formal assessment of the welfare cost of volatility.
Volatility, costly intermediation and welfare
We focus our attention on the case where the share of the variable input exceeds the creditors' power within the legal system measure (κ < β), as one may presume is the case in developing countries.
An example of this case was depicted by Figure 4 . Appendix C investigates the case where κ ≥ β (corresponding to Figure 5 ). We evaluate now the welfare cost of volatility, where the relevant welfare measure for the risk neutral entrepreneurs is the expected producers surplus, (11). Recall that for relatively low volatility, we observe the quasi "voluntary" credit squeeze along curve AB, where
11
Recall that in a Cobb-Douglas function the marginal product schedule is convex with respect to employment, and its elasticity (in absolute terms) is 1 -β. Hence, the convexity diminishes as the share of the variable input raises. (11), collecting terms, we infer that the expected producer's surplus along AB, denoted by Π, is
From which we obtain that in the vicinity of Ε = 0
Note that the standard deviation of productivity (1
, and the mean is 1. Hence, the semi elasticity of the welfare cost with respect to productivity's coefficient of variation is
The welfare cost of volatility in the range of credit restraints is proportional to the difference between the variable input share (β) and the creditors' power within the legal system measure (κ). 12 An alternative way of presenting the welfare cost is as a fraction of output, Y:
For example, if the variable's input share is 0.75, and the legal system's strength measure is 0.25, then
. In these circumstances, a one percent increase in the coefficient of variation of productivity shocks would reduce welfare by more than one percent. Note that the above calculation is a lower estimate of the welfare cost, as it focuses only on the welfare cost attributed to the decline in the
12
Note that β is the share of the variable input financed via borrowing, and κ is the output share that can be used as effective collateral. Greater discrepancy between β and κ increases banks exposure, implying that volatility is more costly.
entrepreneur's surplus, ignoring the welfare cost due to higher unemployment. It is interesting to note the different role of the strength of the legal system (κ) and the cost of state verification (C), Both are determining the range of partial default, as can be seen from (12) and (13). Yet, only the strength of the legal system determines the elasticity of the welfare cost with respect to volatility in the range of the quasivoluntary credit ceiling [as can be seen from (15)]. This follows from the observation that in this range, the downward adjustment of employment due to volatility prevents costly defaults, hence there is no need to verify the state, and the size of C is not relevant. The magnitude of the drop in employment needed to prevent the partial default, however, is larger for weaker legal systems. 13
Policy Conclusions
Our analysis has highlighted several features. First, we have developed a model which is capable of explaining both high spreads and also a high dispersion of spreads across different client types. These results come from assumptions regarding imperfect information (costly state verification) and imperfect enforcement (a limited legal penalty in a 'willingness to pay' type context with bargaining). We conjecture that such imperfections may be client dependent and hence variations in the relevant variables may explain cross-sectional dispersion in credit spreads. Second, we have found that the effects of volatility on economies may be amplified in this context of imperfect financial intermediation. Here, we find that the weaker the legal system in protecting the rights of creditors (low bank bargaining power) the more pronounced the effect of volatility. Furthermore, where production is dependent on a variable input (e.g.:
labor), the greater is the share of that input, then the greater may be the effect of volatility. We also analyzed the role of collateral in the context of this model and found that collateral is a crucial tool to lower spreads and to lower the dispersion of spreads.
These results have strong policy conclusions, deserving further exploration. First, they suggest that attempts to give greater powers to borrowers vizp a viz banks may be misplaced not only in terms of increasing banking spreads but also in terms of the macroeconomic effects of volatility on the economy. In
13
Weaker legal system implies that a given increase in volatility will induce a greater partial default in bad times, requiring greater drop in borrowing if one wishes to avoid partial default.
-18 -short giving too much bargaining power to borrowers in credit market relations may increase unemployment (considering labor as the variable input) in the face of an external shock. An efficient legal system and in particular, the protection of creditor rights, appears to be a determining feature of how the credit market, and hence the economy, in general responds to external shocks. One should keep in mind, however, that our paper focused on the optimal adjusted of the atomistic producer, taking relative price and the supply of the factor input (M) as given. Hence, it does not deal directly with the general equilibrium effects of volatility on aggregate employment and aggregate supply. Exploring these issues is left for future research.
Our results also illustrate the importance of information in credit markets. A credit market with little information on creditors and hence high state verification costs will be one characterized by high lending spreads and a high dispersion of spreads. In this regard it seems that policies to enhance information provision such as the setting up of a public or subsidized credit -bureau may be a useful policy response. Public provision may be required as it is not always in the interests of private borrowers to share information. On the one hand, there is a benefit from a risk reduction viewpoint but on the other there is a cost that others may learn about a private banks' clients hence reducing the banks' rents. In emerging market economies it may be that such rents are indeed high and hence private provision of such information sharing technologies may be at less than the socially optimal level of supply. This may then support a public intervention either in the form of direct provision or the subsidy of private provision or some mixed type of arrangement.
In Argentina, for example, the Central Bank has set up a very extensive credit bureau which now includes the records of some 18,000 large debtors (loans of more than $200,000) and almost 4 million small debtors. Reports are collected on a monthly basis and the information on non-performing clients (in arrears of more than 90 days) is shared throughout the financial system. Financial intermediaries may also make punctual inquiries about particular borrowers, normally following a loan request, and in this case the exact status of all of the debts of that client throughout the banking system is revealed i.e.: both nonperforming loans and also loans that are not in arrears. The Central Bank has recently extended the data asked of the financial intermediaries for larger borrowers to include further client information to allow more sophisticated credit scoring techniques to be employed. Finally, our model highlights the very important role of collateral. Collateral serves to both lower spreads and also to homogenize them across the market. In a model where imperfect competition was present, as opposed to our perfect competition case, we might also therefore conjecture that collateral might have the effect of increasing competition in the sense that it would reduce the possibility of discrimination across client types. Policies may also be required to improve the working of collateral.
Again, considering Argentina as an example, there is evidence that some types of secured loans are preferred by creditors rather than others. For example, car loans appear to function reasonably well with relatively low rates of interest and swift and reasonable credit authorization procedures. On the other hand some types of secured lending appear to be subject to high interest rates and slow and cumbersome procedures. Important examples include agricultural lending secured on livestocks or commodities, and also lending with some type of working machinery as collateral. There is some evidence that in the case of the agricultural sector, lending from private banks has been substituted by suppliers' credit, largely from the big cereal or feed companies and one might conjecture that repeated relationships and client knowledge is then being used rather than collateral in order to obtain better loan recovery rates. What appears to be happening here is that where legal security is good (e.g.: on cars where there is a national register and hence a unique identification of the good and legal perfection of the good subject to the loan contract appears to be reasonably complete), then collateral serves its purpose and has the effects as suggested in our model above. On the other hand, where the legal security is poor, collateral does not serve its purpose well and hence is either not used or is used but subject to high spreads. Collateral in these instances does not have the effect as suggested by our theoretical discussion above. The conclusion is then that collateral is important but can only serve its purpose if creditors' legal security on the good in question is tight.
Moreover, there is little point in having excellent legal security if the processes required to seize and make a sale of the collateral imply an unreasonable time-horizon. The policy implication is that the legal framework, legal procedures and also other supporting infrastructure (e.g.: registers etc.) must function appropriately for collateral to have the important beneficial effects as identified above.
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Concluding remarks
Our study integrated the costly state verification model with a bank's lending framework where the enforcement of contracts is partial. This allowed us to focus on the importance of lenders' bargaining power and the costs of verification in explaining the mere existence and the orderly functioning of the credit market. We illustrated that volatility may lead to first order, large welfare costs in economies where financial intermediation is costly, as is the case in many developing countries. The ultimate welfare cost is determined by the interaction between the creditors' power within the legal system, the share of variable inputs, and the costs of state verification and contract enforcement. We provided a detailed example where under plausible assumptions the semi elasticity of the welfare cost (as a fraction of expected output), with respect to productivity's coefficient of variation exceeds one. In these circumstances, a one percent standard deviation of productivity shock leads to a welfare cost that exceeds one percent of output. This result is consistent with recent empirical studies that found first order adverse effects of volatility measures on private investment and growth [see Aizenman and Marion (1993) , Pindyck and Solimano (1993) and Ramey and Ramey (1995) , Hausmann and Gavin (1995) , and Ghosal and Loungani (1996) ]. Furthermore, we showed that the legal system in protecting creditors' rights is crucial in determining the effects of volatility on an economy through the financial system. We suggested that increasing borrowers' bargaining power in credit relations may be misplaced in that this may not only increase intermediation spreads but may also induce a greater impact of volatility on the economy in general.
We conclude with a discussion of several limitations of our analysis. First, we assumed that all agents are competitive, as would be the case if each agent could choose among a large number of banks, and each bank dealt with a large number of small borrowers. In these circumstances, the equilibrium interest rate charged by the bank is determined by the expected brake-even condition. Calvo and Mendoza (1997) simulations resulted with relatively small welfare costs attributed to portfolio instability. Our analysis suggests that adding costly financial intermediation may magnify these costs considerably.
The purpose of this Appendix is to review analytically the factors determining financial spreads.
Equations (3) For a given volatility, the impact of the collateral on financial spreads is
15
Recall that due to efficiency considerations banks are assumed to operate only on the upwards sloping portion of this curve. It can be shown that if
at the lowest debt level associated with default, the credit ceiling is reached at that debt level. In these circumstances the supply curve has an inverted L shape. This would be the case if verification costs are too large to be recovered, hence the bank would not supply credit levels that would lead to default in some states of nature. In this Appendix we assume that this is not the case. 
and (A3) show that the impact of higher collateral level and of lower costs of financial intermediation is maximized as we approach the financial non viability constraint.
Appendix B
The purpose of this Appendix is to derive the results described in Section 3 for a general distribution. Specifically, suppose that the productivity shock impacting producer i is ε i z ( ) 1 + , where z is a multiplicative term, the size of which determines the variance of the productivity shock ( z ≥ 0). Recall that the expected value of ε i is zero. Consequently, dz > 0 induces a mean preserving increase in the volatility of ε i . We denote by PR i the bank's expected rent on project i. The brake even condition determining the interest rate is 
numerator of (B3), and would reduce the denominator, increasing thereby the responsiveness of the interest rate to the volatility of shocks. Consequently, a lower collateral would increase the rise in the interest rate induced by a mean preserving increase in volatility.
Appendix C
We evaluate now the welfare cost of volatility for the case where the share of the variable input is below the legal system's strength measure (κ ≥ β). For exposition simplicity we focus on the case where the collateral is zero. An example of this case was depicted by Figure 5 . In these circumstances, for volatility below the threshold Ε* ( )/ = − κ β κ , the probability of default is zero, and volatility does not induce any welfare effects [recall (13) 
